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 Abstract. 
 
Trust is important for development but can be hard to build.  In this paper, we report 
on experiments designed to understand the determinants of trust in villages in eastern 
Uganda, and in particular whether trust can be ‘built’ by offering insurance to people 
as a protection against the possibility that the trust they offer will not be reciprocated. 
We find, firstly, that the effects of income and wealth on trust are ambiguous: trust is 
higher in the richer than the poorer village, but once association and female education 
are added as explanatory variables, the wealth effect disappears. Secondly, although 
the offer of insurance is taken up by a majority of players, this is in most cases not an 
‘effective demand’ in the sense of incentivising higher levels of trust. Effective 
demand for insurance, defined in this way, however responds positively to high levels 
of risk efficacy, microfinance membership and female education. Insurance offered in 
this form, therefore, is on its own apparently not a reliable technology for building 
trust; but its effectiveness as a trust-building instrument appears to increase if certain 
complementary institutions are in position. 
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1. Introduction 
Trust is valuable, notably in low and middle income countries where its 
absence may lead into a lethal vicious circle of impoverishment1; but unlike 
physical and indeed human capital, it cannot be bought in any market. How 
then can it be created? 
Experimental games between human beings have been quite widely used to 
demonstrate the existence of trust even in low-income communities, but they 
have not yet tackled the problem of how to bring it into being, other than by 
the standard social-capital route of facilitating association within networks. 
The global set of experiments from fifteen developing countries reported in 
Henrich et al. (2000)  between them fundamentally undermine the axioms of  
the self-interested Rational Economic Man2, but do not speculate concerning 
how the more altruistic rationality which they discover shrinks and expands – 
or could be made to expand. But in principle the possibility for understanding 
this exists, either by correlating the levels of trust which are discovered with 
their potential causes, or by varying the experimental procedure so as to 
provide incentives to higher trust. In this paper, we adopt both approaches. 
The point of departure is provided by a trust experiment originally carried out 
by Abigail Barr, who modified the original Henrich procedures for use in 
Zimbabwe. Specifically,  Barr’s trust game (Barr 2003) is adapted for the 
conditions of Zimbabwean villages from a prototype developed by Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe(‘BDM’,1995) whose purpose was to study the 
determinants of willingness by individuals to make investments in others; both 
authors use the game to study the influence of experience of social interaction 
on trust. The structure of the trust game is very simple: individuals play in 
pairs selected by the experimenter. Within each pair, player 1 is allocated a 
stake, of  which s/he can if she chooses invest a proportion in the other 
player, whose identity is not known to her. The amount invested by the first 
player is then tripled and handed over to the second player. The second 
player then decides whether she wishes to hand anything back to the first 
player. That is the end of the game. Because the game is as short as this and 
because players do not know whom they are playing with, there is no 
possibility for people’s reputations or knowledge of one another to 
                                                 
1 Some of the starkest claims made for social capital relate to the recent experience of 
recession and perestroika in Russia, in which, it has been alleged, ‘those who have access to 
social capital get ahead; those who do not get sick  and die’ (Kennedy et al 1998: 2039). The 
standard exercises illustrating a correlation between trust measures of social capital and 
measures of economic development are Knack and Keefer (1997) and Whiteley(2000), using 
cross-sections of countries, and Narayan and Pritchett(1999), using a cross-section of rural 
households in Tanzania. 
2 ‘The canonical model (i.e. that individuals are entirely self-interested) is not supported in 
any society studied. Second, there is considerably more behavioural variability across groups 
than had been found in previous cross-cultural research, and the canonical model fails in a 
wider variety of ways than in previous experiments’ (Henrich et al. 2000:73) 
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contaminate the results. All first players who venture an investment in the 
other player are aware that they are open to exploitation by that player, but 
also that they are increasing the size of the common pool which is available 
for redistribution (Barr, 2003). 
We first replicate the original trust game and next modify it in three ways in 
order to start understanding the determinants of trust and how it can be ‘built’ 
through policy interventions. Do player 1 offers decrease when they know 
players 2 need the money? The first variant of the original trust game 
considers what happens if a relatively rich player 1 group plays against (and 
know they play against) a relatively poor player 2 group. Is it possible to build 
‘trust’ by incentivising it? The second variant is one in which players 1 are 
offered the possibility to insure themselves against player 2 abuse. 
Importantly, both players 2 and players 1 are aware of the possibility of 
insurance. Does incentivising trust crowd out genuinely altruistic intentions, as 
in Titmuss (1970)? In order to be able to test this, a third variant modifies the 
second one by not informing players 2 of the possibility that players 1 may 
have taken out insurance. 
 
2. Replication of the ‘trust game’ 
 The trust experiments: design 
 The data for this study are from Uganda, a country with similar per 
capita GDP to, although a very different historical background and productive 
structure to, Zimbabwe; and were collected in August 2003 in two villages on 
which we already hold extensive data on economic characteristics, risk 
attitudes and social histories (Horrell et al 2003) which potentially might offer 
insight into the correlates and determinants of trust. Salient features of these 
villages, Sironko and Bufumbo, are reported in Table 1: 
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 Table 1. Characteristics of the research locations 
 Sironko Bufumbo 
Height above sea level 1100m 1600m 
Type of agricultural land  Lowlands at the foot of Mount Elgon, 
marshy plain in the South, savannah 
grassland in the North, few volcanic 
soils  
Highlands on the slopes of Mount 
Elgon, volcanic soils 
Agricultural calendar: 
       Major rains  
       Major harvest 
       Minor rains 
       Minor harvest 
 
March-June 
July 
Aug-Sept 
October-November 
 
March-June 
July 
Aug-Oct 
November 
Average rainfall 1580mm/year 2168mm/year 
Population size 6400 15285 
Population density 300/km2 550/km2
Casual agricultural labourers (% of 
population) 
27.3% 1.3% 
Main crops Bananas, maize, groundnuts, beans Bananas, maize, beans, coffee, 
tomatoes, cabbages, onions 
Typical plot size 2-3 acres 1-2 acres 
Large farms (>20 acres) 5% 0% 
Average household income (monthly 
per equivalent adult) 
Sh 83039($43) Sh 43492($22) 
Tribes Iteso (immigrants from Kumi) and 
Bagisu (indigenous) 
Bagisu (also called Bamasaba in 
Bufumbo) 
Religion Predominantly Christian (Catholic, 
Protestant, pentecostal) 
Islam(80-90%) 
Roads Good quality tarred motor road south 
to Mbale and north to Kapchorwa, 
poor quality dirt roads otherwise 
Dirt roads, often steep, four-wheel 
drive only in bad weather 
Schools One secondary school, four primary 
schools 
One secondary school, eight primary 
schools 
Clinics Two private health centres in 
Sironko.  
None 
Electricity 85% 0% 
Extension services Uganda National Farmers’ 
Association, Mbale (not very active 
in Sironko) 
Uganda National Farmers’ 
Association, Mbale (very active in 
Bufumbo) 
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Non-agricultural employment 
opportunities 
Trade, hotels and bars in trading 
centre, ginnery, processing plant for 
maize, abattoir, mechanics 
Trade (mostly in Mbale town), 
beekeeping 
Access to credit Centenary Bank (individual loans) 
PRIDE, FOCCAS (group micro-
credit for women) 
 
Restricted access to credit. Group 
microcredit only (Centenary Bank 
has withdrawn) 
 
Source: Muzaki 1998; background reports compiled on request by Mbale local government 
officers. Particular thanks to Patrick Natanga (formerly extension officer in Bufumbo) 
 
Within these settings, we organised eight sessions of the trust game involving 
67 pairs of players (33 in Sironko and 34 in Bufumbo)3. The Bufumbo 
sessions were on Wednesday 27 and the Sironko sessions on Thursday 28 
August, 2003. As previously explained,  the identity of each Player 1 was 
secret to each Player 2 and vice versa, and all players were mandated to 
inform nobody, not even their families, how they had played. A full rubric for 
the games we organised is provided in the appendix to this paper. 
 Table 2 presents an overall picture of the decisions of first and second 
players in our trust game in relation to those designed by BDM in the United 
States and by Barr in Zimbabwe. 
                                                 
3 A remaining 224 members of the sample (112 pairs) played variants of the trust game, on which we 
report below. 
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 Table 2 Trust game: Responses by first and second players in the 
United States, Zimbabwe and Uganda 
 
 US: Berg et al. 
1995 
Zimbabwe: Barr 2003 Uganda: This study 
    
Overall 
 
Sironko 
 
Bufumbo 
 
Mean annual income 
per equivalent adult 
$32,500 $450 $399 $538 $282 
Number of playing 
pairs 
32 141 67 33 34 
Initial endowment 
size 
10 US $ 20 Zimbabwe dollars (c. 
$0.70) 
4000 Ugandan shillings (c.$2) 
Proportion of first 
players who invested 
zero 
0.06 0.09 0.07   
Mean investment for 
first players 
$5.16 $0.30 $1.0 $1.2 $0.9 
Mean investment as 
proportion of stake 
0.52 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.44 
Mean response 
(expressed as a 
proportion of 
investment) 
0.89 1.28 0.99 1.43 0.66 
Sources: for US experiments, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe(1995); for Zimbabwe experiments, 
Barr(2003); for Uganda experiments, our own data as described on pp.2-5 above (for 
interview protocol please see Appendix) 
We can first of all report, almost routinely, that trust is alive and well in 
Eastern Uganda as in the locations of the other surveys reported by Henrich 
et al. Both the mean investment of first players (49% of the available stake) 
and the mean response by second players (99% of the first player’s initial 
investment) across the two villages are in between those observed by Barr in 
Zimbabwe and those observed by BDM in the United States, whereas 
observed behaviour in Sironko is closer to the latter and that in Bufumbo 
closer to the former. 
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Determinants of trust 
In seeking to understand the determinants of trust, BDM and Barr both use 
the trust game to investigate the influence of ’social history’ on trust – in the 
Barr case by comparing first and second player responses as between 
communities who had lived together a long time and communities which were 
recently resettled and thus lacked a social history. Our own interest is at this 
stage focussed on the influence not only of social history but specifically of the 
experience of poverty – since if that inhibits the formation of social relations 
that is an additional twist in the spiral – and also of policy variables which may 
incentivise mutual trust, and in particular insurance. Specifically, we seek to 
assess by regression analysis the following determinants of trusting (Player 1) 
and trustworthy (Player 2) behaviour in a regression analysis. 
• Measures of well-being, in particular income and physical assets. 
As we have noted, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) find that the link 
between trust and income is exclusively one from trust to income. 
By contrast, our experimentally obtained data, in which income and 
assets are in effect pre-determined variables (see below), allow us 
to isolate a direction of influence the other way about. 
• Measures of human capital. That education helps to create social 
capital is a finding so far mainly examined and confirmed in 
industrialised countries. Appleton (2001) quantifies the individual 
return on education for Uganda. In a portfolio model of capital 
accumulation, human and social capital are likely to be 
complementary: it pays more to invest in networks when one’s level 
of education gives access to more rewarding employment 
opportunities (Glaeser et al. 2002). There may therefore be an 
important indirect payoff from the enormous investment put into 
schooling by the Ugandan government in recent years. 
• Measures of association. The large database on our subjects 
compiled in the two years preceding the experiments on which we 
currently report contains various indicators of the degree in which 
households and individuals are linked with other households and 
individuals and with society at large. The indicator most relevant for 
our present purposes is a measure of bonding social capital. It 
captures the number, nature and intensity of reciprocal links 
between households. For details of its construction see Mosley et 
al. (2003, chapter 6). 
• Institutions and policies which ‘incentivise’ trust; these are the main 
focus of our enquiry. A reasonable expectation of reciprocity – 
Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s response – would increase the 
likelihood of trusting behaviour. We will explain below in what way 
we consider this reasonable expectation to be formed by 
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determinants from the previous three categories. By contrast, in the 
next section we examine what happens to trust and trustworthy 
behaviour when, through an external intervention, a guarantee of 
reciprocity is substituted for a reasonable expectation. 
Econometric identification in this type of analysis requires careful estimation. 
With social capital (trusting and trustworthy behaviour; intensity of 
association) and ‘effort’ (risk-taking and thence income, expenditures and 
assets) contemporaneously determined, recovering model parameters is 
seldom achieved (cf. Durlauf 2002). However, experimentally obtained data 
permit a convenient short-cut (cf. Glaeser et al. 2000). Subjects’ outside-the-
laboratory circumstances and characteristics, though still as a matter of 
course influencing their behaviour once inside the laboratory, become fully 
contextual, therefore pre-determined, and may be treated as exogenous for 
estimation purposes4. But the short-cut should not be taken too hastily. Whilst 
trustworthy (Player 2) behaviour responds to a known initiative, trusting 
(Player 1) behaviour second-guesses a response. Player 1’s beliefs about 
Player 2’s secret preferences for reciprocity will in part be based on levels of 
actual reciprocity she has observed in her village, and in part – because the 
experiment is unlike anything she has ever experienced in her village – on her 
knowledge of what she herself would do in secret: in other words, trusting 
behaviour is in part a projection of one’s own trustworthiness (cf. Orbell and 
Dawes 1993), and in part the sort of leap of faith required when ‘mere 
prediction’ is an inadequate basis for action (cf. Lewis and Weigert 1985: 970, 
976). Econometrically this boils down to using the coefficients obtained from a 
regression of Player 2 behaviour in order to form an empirical analogue of the 
unobserved Player 1’s expectation of Player 2 behaviour. Trust in the sense 
of ‘projecting one’s own trustworthiness’ is then imputed by inserting Player 1 
characteristics (naturally apart from her actual offer) into the Player 2 
regression equation: this exercise tells us what our model predicts a typical 
Player 1 with precisely these characteristics would do if she were in Player 2’s 
shoes. The regression of Player 1 behaviour then becomes a second-stage 
regression with as its only argument the expectation of reciprocity constructed 
as just described, an expectation which itself depends on the individual-
specific determinants of trustworthy behaviour that we have postulated. 
Trusting behaviour in the sense of ‘a leap of faith exceeding mere prediction’ 
corresponds with the (positive) residuals that this regression implies. 
Table 3 reports the results of this regression analysis, with the first player offer 
(s), the second player response (r) and the ratio of the two (r/s), as in the Barr 
analysis, as dependent variables. Contrary to what we had surmised when 
comparing Bufumbo and Sironko in Table 2, in which both trusting and 
trustworthy behaviour are significantly lower in the poorer village5, income and 
                                                 
4 The downside of the de facto exogeneity of certain choice variables is that experimentally obtained 
trust data are not particularly suitable for explaining the formation of associations. In Section 4 we 
therefore complement the analysis with questionnaire-based trust data – which of course come with 
their own limitations (cf. Glaeser et al. 2000).  
5 As may be seen from Table 2, first and second player responses, without controls, are higher in the 
richer than in the poorer village. Indeed, different patterns of response are observable in the two 
villages through the experiment as a whole: in Sironko, people are more trusting, and their responses 
cluster around a modal interaction in which the first player invests Sh2000, and the second player 
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assets now appear, once associational social capital and education are held 
constant, as negative influences on trustworthy behaviour and therefore, 
through Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s behaviour – itself significantly 
positive – as a negative influence on trusting behaviour. Our measure of 
bonding social capital, as expected, is a positive influence on trust and 
reciprocity, and so is female education (but not male education – tried but not 
reported on here). It is possible that female education proxies for a social 
capital indicator that captures membership of self-help groups: educated 
women tend to belong to these more often. When we included both female 
education and a self-help group membership dummy neither was significant, 
and when we included this dummy on its own, it was significant. Because of 
our priors we report female education in the table. The difference between 
Bufumbo and Sironko that we noted in a more superficial comparison in Table 
2 survives a more rigorous comparison: the coefficient on the Bufumbo = 1 
dummy is large and hugely significant. 
In order to test experimentally – rather than econometrically – the influence of 
poverty on trusting and trustworthy behaviour, we returned to Bufumbo in 
March 2005. We recruited 112 individuals and selected 56 for a variant of the 
original trust game in which richer players 1 play against (and know they play 
against) poorer players 26. Individuals were ranked according to income and 
the 28 richest individuals were selected to be players 1, and the 28 poorest to 
be players 2. The results are reported in Table 4 and confirm our econometric 
findings. Mean player 1 investment as a proportion of the original stake is 
significantly lower than before (t = -2.2582) and mean player 2 response 
higher (t – 5.1178). This is consistent with our econometrically inspired 
account above, in which the rich are more opportunistic than the poor but 
apparently not aware that the poor are more trustworthy than they 
themselves: they project their own (low) trustworthiness onto them.
                                                                                                                                            
reciprocally gives back Sh2000, or one-third of this amount tripled. In Bufumbo, the poorer village, 
people are less trusting and their responses cluster around a modal interaction in which the first player 
invests Sh1000, and the second player reciprocally gives back also Sh1000, or one-third of this amount 
tripled. In Bufumbo first players are also much more willing to insure themselves against the 
possibility of being exploited by the second player, as we discuss later. 
6 With the remaining 56 individuals we played a variant of the insurance game, on which we report 
below. 
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 Table 3. Correlates of trust: regression analysis 
 
 Dependent variable and estimation method 
 Player 1 offer (s) Player 2 response (r) Proportional 
response (r/s) 
Independent 
variables 
Generated 
regressor 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Constant 1626.3*** 
(9.533) 
 
 
1963.4*** 
(3.382) 
1982.7*** 
(3.768) 
1.996*** 
(7.333) 
1.932*** 
(7.659) 
Bufumbo = 1   -1967.1*** 
(-5.375) 
-2207.4*** 
(-6.158) 
-0.798*** 
(-5.124) 
-0.868*** 
(-5.617) 
Player 1 offer   0.585*** 
(3.136) 
0.527*** 
(2.918) 
-0.000* 
(-2.136) 
-0.000* 
(-2.378) 
Expectation of 
Player 2 
response 
0.276*** 
(2.693) 
     
Assets: 
Total (risk 
efficacy index) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-636.9 
(-1.582) 
  
-0.297* 
(-1.764) 
 
Income per 
equivalent 
household 
member 
   -0.005** 
(-2.432) 
 -2.03E-06* 
(-2.082) 
Index of 
bonding social 
capital 
  410.8** 
(2.141) 
352.4** 
(2.067) 
0.147* 
(1.821) 
0.123 
(1.647) 
Female 
educational 
level (1 if 
higher than 
primary 
  
 
1494.7*** 
(2.680) 
1321.5** 
(2.510) 
0.377 
(1.640) 
0.291 
(1.316) 
R2 0.117  0.592 0.620 0.474 0.489 
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N 67  67 67 67 67 
Notes: 
• N = 67 pairs of players (134 individuals) 
• T-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level, respectively 
• The variable ‘Player 1 expectation of Player 2 response’ is computed as: 1982.7 
– 2207.4*(Bufumbo =1; Sironko = 0) – 0.005*(monthly income per equivalent 
adult) + 352.4*(bonding social capital) + 1321.5*(female education), inserting 
Player 1 characteristics into the best-performing Player 2 regression. For details 
of and the rationale behind this procedure see the text. 
Source: data from trust experiments, August 2003, in association with Uganda database 
(Horrell et al 2003).  
Table 4. Modified trust game, variant 1: richer players 1 against poorer 
players 2 
 Bufumbo 
Number of playing pairs 28 
Mean investment for first players 1,456 UGS 
Mean investment for first players as 
proportion of stake 
0.37 
Mean response for second players 
expressed as a proportion of investment 
0.98 
Source: modified trust game, variant 1, as described in text and played in Bufumbo on 
March 24, 2005 
 
 
3. The ‘insurance game’ 
Many of these apparent determinants of trust are not easy for policy-
makers or outside authorities to influence, and it is therefore natural to look for 
expedients which might augment people’s degree of trust. One obvious 
possibility is insurance: if first players were protected in some way against the 
possibility of exploitation by the second player, they might have more 
incentive to invest in her, and such protection is what insurance, in principle, 
provides. Accordingly, for some groups of players (who did not play the trust 
game and are kept separate from those who do) we modify the Barr/BDM 
game into an insurance game: first players are told that if and only if they 
commit to investing Sh1000 or more in the other player, they can lay off some 
of the potential loss by paying a Sh 1000 premium to an ‘insurance company’ 
(the administration of the game). In the event that any amount invested in the 
second player is not returned, it is guaranteed to come back to them – net, of 
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course, of the insurance premium. The existence of an insurance facility thus 
potentially acts as an incentive to first players to increase their trust in others7, 
much as tax exemptions are used to incentivise charitable donations. Does 
this form of incentive work in practice? 
The initial results, as illustrated in table 5, are unexpected and somewhat 
depressing. There is plenty of willingness to insure, but across the sample as 
a whole, greater trust (in the sense of first-player offers) is shown by those 
who are not offered insurance!  For anyone whose purpose is to incentivise 
mutual trust it is important to understand this paradox. We offer an 
explanation in four parts8. 
 
Table  5. Modified trust game, variant 2: the impact of insurance (first 
player offers as a proportion of initial stake).  
 Overall Sironko Bufumbo 
Pure trust game (no 
insurance available) 
N = 134 (67 pairs of 
players) 
0.49 0.54 0.44 
Insurance game 
(insurance available) 
N = 104 (52 pairs of 
players) 
0.43 0.51 0.34 
t-stat for difference 
between sample 
means 
(and associated 
significance level) 
 
2.193** 
 
(0.035) 
1.720 
 
(0.105) 
2.136** 
 
(0.049) 
Insurance game background data: 
Number of players: 104 individuals, 52 pairs of players: 26 in Sironko, 26 in Bufumbo 
Takers of insurance: 52% in Sironko, 82 % in Bufumbo 
First players offering zero: 5.9 % 
                                                 
7 Note that if the first player chooses to buy insurance s/he sacrifices not only a ‘tax’ on gains, in the 
shape of the insurance premium, but also the possibility of maximum gains, since it is no longer 
possible to invest the maximum stake of Sh 4000 in the second player – Sh 1000 must be sacrificed to 
pay the insurance premium. 
8 Possible framing effects are not included in the explanation because of their speculative nature. For 
example, whereas the introduction of insurance may make some players feel safer, it may make others 
feel less safe because it increases awareness of the possibility of exploitation. 
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 Insurance riddle, part I: less is available for investment 
First of all, and rather obviously, the insurance premium reduces the original 
stake: once insurance is taken out, less is available for Player 1 investment 
(cf. footnote 5 above). When expressed as a proportion not of the original but 
of the remaining stake (i.e. 4,000 shillings for those who did not, 3,000 for 
those who did take out insurance), Player 1 offers are: 
 Insurance game Trust game t-statistic for 
difference 
between column 
means 
P 
In Sironko 0.60 0.54 1.580 0.121 
In Bufumbo 0.45 0.44 0.021 0.983 
When expressed as a proportion of the remaining stake, Player 1 offers are 
higher in the insurance game than in the trust game. A t-test for the difference 
between sample means does not, however, suggest that the apparent 
insurance-induced trust is statistically significant. 
 
Insurance riddle, part II: reciprocity is valued less 
Moreover, the presence of insurance alters player 2 preferences for 
reciprocity. Player 2 knows that player 1 has the possibility to take out 
insurance, but they don’t know whether they have. If players 2 knew for 
certain that players 1 were protected against ‘exploitation’, more of them 
might no longer have qualms about returning zero. The reason is that taking 
advantage of an uninsured player 1, as in the original trust game, abuses a 
fellow-villager, but taking advantage of an insured player 1 abuses the 
‘insurance company’, who are in this case foreign academics who do not pay 
for the research out of their own pockets. Of course, even in the insurance 
game, players 2 do not know whether or not their counterparts, whose 
choices are made in secret, have taken out insurance. But the possibility that 
they have may lead players 2 to reduce their return as a proportion of player 
1’s investment. Is this in fact what we see? Player 2 return as a proportion of 
player 1 investment is: 
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  Insurance game Trust game t-statistic for 
difference 
between column 
means 
P 
In Sironko 1.04 1.43 -2.389* 0.022 
In Bufumbo 0.67 0.59 -0.569 0.573 
t-statistic for 
difference 
between row 
means 
5.274** 2.940**   
P 0.000 0.006   
The t-tests suggest that players 2 do return less when players 1 may be 
insured, considerably and significantly so in Sironko. Note too the 
astonishingly low players 2 return in Bufumbo, both in the insurance and in 
the trust game – we will return to these below. 
 
 
Insurance riddle, part III: less reciprocity is expected 
If player 2 preferences for reciprocity may change in the presence of 
insurance, so may player 1 ‘reasonable expectations of reciprocity’. A player 1 
will reason that if they were player 2, and they knew that they were playing 
against a possibly insured player 1, they would reduce their return as a 
proportion of player 1 investment. Players 1 will thus expect to receive less 
from players 2 when insurance is introduced in the game. For this reason, 
insured players 1 may decide to invest less than 3,000 shillings – the original 
stake net of the insurance premium. By investing less, they weaken the signal 
to player 2 that they have taken out insurance, and thereby increase the 
probability that they receive a return on their investment (from player 2) rather 
than just their money back (from the insurance company). It is important to 
realise that these considerations are not far-fetched. Anyone supposing that 
illiterate and semi-literate small farmers in a poor-country context do not 
engage in such mind games would be mistaken: from spontaneously offered 
feedback by players 1 to the survey-coordinator we know that at least some of 
our subjects reasoned precisely along these lines.  
However, the plausibility of this interpretation requires that subjects 
understood the insurance game. In the event that insurance is taken out, the 
rational player 1 strategy is to invest the full remainder of their original stake 
(which can now be done without risk) unless they reason that this strategy 
signals to player 1 that in all likelihood insurance has been taken out. Since 
we observe that many players 1 that take out insurance do not invest the full 
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remainder of their stake, we must conclude that they are either irrational or 
avoid giving the signal that they are insured (or both). In order to avoid basing 
our conclusion that incentivising trust potentially undermines other trusting 
and trustworthy behaviour on the strong assumption that the insurance game 
was perfectly understood by subjects, we returned to Bufumbo – where the 
impact of insurance on first player offers is stronger than in Sironko (see 
Table 5) – and played a variant of the insurance game in which players 2 are 
unaware of the presence of insurance in the game. Of 28 players 1, 12 take 
out insurance and all of these invest the full remainder of the stake (see Table 
6) – the rational strategy in this particular variant of the game. We have thus 
tested experimentally the assumption that the insurance game is understood, 
and may therefore place some confidence in the assertion that incentivising 
trust to a degree crowds out other types of trusting and trustworthy behaviour. 
 
Table 6. Modified trust game, variant 3 – the impact of insurance and 
asymmetric information 
 Bufumbo 
No. of pairs of players 28 
No. of players 1 that take out insurance 12 
Mean investment of players 1 that take out 
insurance 
3,000 UGS 
Mean investment of players 1 (overall) 1,964 UGS 
Mean investment of players 1 (overall) as 
a proportion of the original stake 
0.49 
Mean player 2 response as a proportion of 
player 1 investment 
0.96 
Source: modified trust game, variant 3, as described in text and played in Bufumbo on 
March 24, 2005 
 
 
Insurance riddle, part IV: Selection bias 
A final reason why insurance may appear not to induce higher levels of trust is 
one of selection bias. If a preference for insurance is related to expected 
reciprocity (which seems plausible), then its effectiveness measured as a 
comparison of mean trust scores as between an insured and an uninsured 
group may be biased. The bias could in principle be either upwards or 
downwards, but common sense suggests it should be downwards. For 
example, as we reported earlier, the income rich tend to expect less 
reciprocity, which one would expect ceteris paribus to lead them to be more 
inclined than others to take out insurance. As a result, the proportion of rich 
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people in the insured group will tend to be higher than in the uninsured group 
(meaning either the uninsured in the insurance game or all participants in the 
trust game – whichever is used as the control group), and measures of 
insurance effectiveness based on a simple comparison of mean trust scores 
biased. With income negatively related to expected reciprocity (Table 3), 
insurance negatively (in this example hypothetically, but we test below), and 
trust positively (Table 3), the direction of the bias is downwards – the 
comparison-of-means measure underestimates insurance effectiveness. 
In the first column of Table 7 we therefore enter the player 1 characteristics 
which we know to be associated with expected reciprocity (from Table 3) into 
a logistic regression of whether or not insurance has been taken out. 
Independent variables are either insignificant (social capital, female 
education) or enter significantly with the expected sign: ‘a higher income’ and 
‘living in Bufumbo’, both of which we have seen to be associated negatively 
with demonstrating and expecting reciprocity, increase the propensity to take 
out insurance. Since they also tend to reduce player 1 offers (Table 3), we 
have good reasons to believe our previous measure of insurance 
effectiveness to be downwardly biased. 
In the next columns of Table 7 we therefore investigate the impact of 
insurance on the player 1 offer controlling for expected reciprocity. Expected 
reciprocity is computed precisely as in Table 3 – that is, weights on its 
components are taken from the relevant trust game regression. The reason 
for this is that we have established above (riddle part II and III) that one of the 
mechanisms by which insurance influences player 1 behaviour is through 
changing expected reciprocity. A proper assessment of insurance 
effectiveness requires that the insurance dummy picks up these changes. The 
player 1 offer is first measured in shillings, next as a proportion of the original 
stake (which is essentially the same regression as the previous one but 
facilitates comparison with the one that follows), and finally as a proportion of 
the remaining stake (the original minus when appropriate the insurance 
premium – because of riddle part I). R squares improve considerably, first 
when the insurance dummy is added and next when a more correct measure 
of player 1 trust is used. When selection bias is controlled for, insurance is in 
each regression seen to be associated with higher levels of trust. The final 
(preferred) regression suggests that insurance increases player 1 offers by 
about a quarter. 
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Table 7 Expectation of reciprocity and insurance effectiveness 
 Dependent variable and estimation method 
 Take out 
insurance? 
Yes = 1, no 
= 0. 
Player 1 
offer 
Player 1 
offer 
Player 1 
offer as 
proportion 
of original 
stake 
Player 1 
offer as 
proportion 
of 
remaining 
stake 
Independent 
variables 
Logistic 
regression 
Generated 
regressor 
Generated 
regressor 
Generated 
regressor 
Generated 
regressor 
Constant -1.543 
(1.371) 
1559.7*** 
(13.090) 
1058.0*** 
(4.352) 
0.265*** 
(4.352) 
0.251*** 
(3.508) 
Take out 
insurance = 
1 (yes) 
  431.7* 
(1.832) 
0.108* 
(1.832) 
0.260*** 
(3.746) 
Player 1 
expectation 
of player 2 
response 
 0.247*** 
(3.620) 
0.279*** 
(3.486) 
6.965E-
05*** 
(3.486) 
7.596E-
05*** 
(3.223) 
And its 
components: 
     
Bufumbo = 1  2.403** 
(4.478) 
    
Income per 
equivalent 
household 
member 
+0.001* 
(2.721) 
    
Index of 
bonding 
social capital 
0.241 
(0.352) 
    
Female 
education 
dummy (1 is 
higher than 
primary) 
-1.659 
(2.185) 
    
R2 0.367 
(Nagelkerke) 
0.128 0.285 0.285 0.362 
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N 52 52 52 52 52 
Notes: 
• N = 52 pairs of players (104 individuals) 
• T-statistics in parentheses (Wald for the logistic regression); *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively 
• The variable ‘Player 1 expectation of Player 2 response’ is computed as: 1982.7 
– 2207.4*(Bufumbo =1; Sironko = 0) – 0.005*(monthly income per equivalent 
adult) + 352.4*(bonding social capital) + 1321.5*(female education), inserting 
Player 1 characteristics into the best-performing Player 2 regression for 
participants in the trust game (see Table 3). For details of and the rationale 
behind this procedure see the text. 
Source: data from insurance and trust experiments, August 2003, in association with Uganda 
database (Horrell et al 2003).  
 
 
 
4.  Trust and association measures of social capital: potential policy 
implications 
Bonding social capital is associated with higher expected reciprocity and 
through that channel with higher levels of trust (Table 3), but not with taking 
out insurance (Table 7) – there exists therefore the important possibility that 
the two act as substitutes for one another. Before investigating determinants 
and possible policy handles on insurance effectiveness in terms of increasing 
trust, it is therefore first necessary to consider the link between the trust 
definition of social capital and the associational definition. Figure 1 illustrates 
a simple picture of the two-way interaction between these concepts, which 
summarises the analysis of Mosley et al (2003).  How far association within 
organisations breeds trust depends on the evaluation which association 
members make of that organisation, and in particular of its leadership. But it 
also appears to depend on income and assets. Meanwhile there is a feedback 
in the opposite direction from trust to association: people who trust one 
another more have a predisposition to form associations. The a priori 
influence of income is ambiguous: richer people are freer to invest their cash 
resources in associations with trusted people, but against this, partnerships 
formed in adversity generate strong bonding social capital.  
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 Figure 1. A simple two-way relationship between association 
and trust 
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We now (Table  8) estimate this two-way relationship, by OLS and 
instrumental-variables methods. ‘Association’ is measured as an average of 
‘bonding social capital’ (membership of affinity groups whose membership is 
concentrated within the village), ‘bridging social capital’ (membership of 
associations extending beyond the village) and ‘linking social capital’ (social 
or professional linkages with government officials, NGOs and private 
companies). The strength of experimentally obtained data in their ability to 
facilitate a one-way analysis of the influence of otherwise endogenous but 
with respect to behaviour in the laboratory pre-determined and therefore 
practically exogenous variables (such as association) is also a weakness 
when one is interested in the formation of such variables.  For ‘trust’ we 
therefore now use in the first instance a straightforward World Values Survey- 
type question about the extent to which the respondent trusts individuals 
within the community. One advantage is that this expands the sample for 
which we have relevant data. 
We start by investigating the influence of the factors that we found 
previously to raise expected reciprocity and thereby trust in an experimental 
setting on the questionnaire-based trust indicator in a simple OLS regression, 
with the difference that now the index of bonding social capital is replaced 
with possible determinants of its effectiveness, to avoid simultaneity problems 
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later on when investigating the link from association to trust: members’ 
subjective evaluation of the effectiveness of group organisation and 
leadership, intragroup equality, and what we call the ‘trust gap’ – the 
difference between the degree of trust evinced between ‘members of one’s 
immediate community’ – typically the village – and ‘Ugandans as a whole’, 
and which has also been called, ‘the dark side of [bonding] social capital’. 
Female education, but no longer income, and each of the proxies of 
associational effectiveness is significantly associated with the questionnaire-
based trust indicator. Perhaps most intriguing of all, it is strongly responsive to 
the trust gap. The higher this gap, one is tempted to conclude, the greater the 
rate at which associational membership converts into trust. On that view, trust 
within the communities of Sironko and Bufumbo would be fed by distrust of 
Ugandans as a whole; trust is not a homogeneous asset which can be 
infinitely extended, but rather a positional good which thrives through distrust 
of others – and potentially by creating distrust of others. This is not a new 
insight – it has been developed in relation to the Sicilian Mafia, for example, 
by Diego Gambetta9 – but it has important implications for those wishing to 
understand trust-building mechanisms, which we develop in the concluding 
section.  
In the ‘trust to association’ relationship, we filter out the relationship 
running in the opposite direction by using the significant variables in the 
questionnaire-based trust indicator regression as instruments, which the 
Hausman test suggests is important to do. Be that as it may, both with and 
without filtering, we observe a fairly orthodox positive influence of expected 
reciprocity, constructed as before but now for the Uganda database as a 
whole, on associational membership. A predisposition to trust, measured as 
the degree of reciprocity one expects to find in the community one is a 
member of, also predisposes one to forge links with members of one’s 
community. Since income is a negative influence on expected reciprocity, this 
finding contrasts with the Narayan and Pritchett view, quoted above, that 
social capital uni-directionally determines income and expenditure.  
 
                                                 
9 ‘It is by offering trust in conjunction with discouraging competition that the mafioso ends up selling 
trust as… a good that one seller can consume only if other sellers do not. And this is why competition 
develops in harmful ways.. by throttling the market rather than letting it work freely’. Gambetta 1988, 
p. 172. 
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Table 8. Uganda database: estimates of the two-way relationship, using 
a questionnaire-based indicator of trust 
 
 Trust ?Association Association 
?Trust 
 Dependent variable and estimation method 
 Composite social 
capital (a mixture 
of bonding, 
bridging and 
linking 
associational 
memberships) 
Composite social 
capital (a mixture 
of bonding, 
bridging and 
linking 
associational 
memberships) 
Trust in affinity 
group 
Independent 
variables 
2SLS Generated 
regressor 
OLS 
Constant 0.303 
(0.93) 
0.711*** 
(8.438) 
1.85*** 
(3.90) 
Expected 
reciprocity 
0.0004*** 
(2.94) 
0.0003*** 
(6.079) 
 
Income per 
equivalent adult 
  2.57 
(0.18) 
Female education   0.38* 
(1.95) 
‘Trust gap’ 
between affinity 
group and 
Ugandans as a 
whole 
  0.27** 
(5.17) 
Member’s 
evaluation of 
group 
effectiveness 
  0.19* 
(2.01) 
Member’s 
evaluation of 
equality 
  0.30** 
(3.66) 
Hausman, chi-
square 
5.10*   
R2 0.294 0.108 0.36 
N 297 297 297 
Notes: 
• T-statistics in parentheses; *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
level, respectively 
• The variable ‘expected reciprocity’ is computed as: 1982.7 – 2207.4*(Bufumbo 
=1; Sironko = 0) – 0.005*(monthly income per equivalent adult) + 352.4*(bonding 
social capital) + 1321.5*(female education), inserting individuals’ characteristics 
into the best-performing Player 2 regression for participants in the trust game 
(see Table 3). For details of and the rationale behind this procedure see the text. 
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Source: data from insurance and trust experiments, August 2003, in association with Uganda 
database (Horrell et al 2003).  
 
                Some tentative policy implications thus begin to appear from the 
quantitative evidence so far.  Levels of trust are responsive to higher levels of 
female education, better-functioning institutions and higher levels of 
intragroup equality, as well as (controversially and not yet robustly 
demonstrated) through creating suspicion of others.  It may not be possible to 
create experiential trust10 through a market process, but it appears to be 
possible to create it by creating institutions in which members have 
confidence, as well as by institutional developments which have a bearing on 
education and on perceptions of equality. 
  However, other mechanisms are important. External agents can 
influence experiential trust only indirectly, but they can create incentivised 
trust if they are able to design incentives which reduce the costs of being 
exploited. As we have already discovered, this is not a simple mechanical 
process. In our experimental ‘insurance game’ , we showed that there exists a 
substantial demand for insurance in Sironko and Bufumbo, but that insurance 
elicits higher levels of trust only within the higher-income village, and that the 
‘effectiveness’ of insurance in general is positively associated with income 
and negatively with social capital. Mosley et al. (2003), in Chapter 4, show 
that all kinds of benefits for lower income groups can be extracted from 
microinsurance, many of them in the form of externalities; but getting these 
benefits to materialise does not appear to be easy11. What can be done? 
 In Table 9 we examine the influence of individual characteristics and 
particular potential policy handles on our measure of the effectiveness of 
insurance. The dependent variable is the offer (the degree of revealed trust) 
of player 1 in the insurance game, less the mean of player 1 offers under the 
situation of no insurance – our measure of the leverage of insurance is an 
‘effective demand’. Naturally, subtracting a constant from each of the 
dependent variable observations does not alter any of the coefficients apart 
from the intercept: but the advantage of doing so nonetheless is that the latter 
now has a ready interpretation as the part of insurance effectiveness (as 
identified in Table 5) that is not explained by our analysis: the intercept is 
insignificant in each of the regressions reported in Table 9. Note too that since 
we limit the analysis in Table 9 to insured players, the problem of selection 
bias discussed in Section 3 does not apply.  
Income and assets, as we had surmised, are weakly significant influences on 
insurance leverage – the offer of insurance only begins to elicit higher levels 
of trust once a certain income threshold is crossed12. But, interestingly, social 
capital in the sense of associational membership detracts from and does not 
                                                 
10 From here onward: ‘experiential trust’ = trust which is created by interactions between people, 
‘incentivised trust’ = trust which is created by devices or institutions which reduce the loss resulting 
from misplacing trust (Mosley et al 2003, Ch.3) . Insurance is, in principle, an example of an institution 
capable of creating incentivised trust. 
11 For a (mainly qualitative) discussion of the determinants of the demand for microinsurance services 
see the study by Cohen and Sebstad(2003). 
12 Indeed, effective demand for insurance appears to be kinked (Figure 3 below) – there is very little 
demand for it at low levels of income. 
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add to the effectiveness of insurance. As illustrated by the bar chart of Figure 
2, those individuals who were most strongly incentivised by insurance had 
very few associational memberships, whereas those who were strongly 
networked often had many. Interviews with the ‘outliers’ strongly supported 
the initial impression that (experimentally offered) insurance and (actual) 
social capital might be acting as substitutes for one another. Respondent 235, 
for example (who appears as a highly incentivised outlier on Figure 2), told us, 
‘I can only be trusting if I know there is an [insurance] organisation behind me, 
because I cannot rely on any [informal] association to protect me (interview 
28.08.03;emphasis added). The implication would appear to be, firstly, that 
one cannot rely on insurance as a magic lubricant for markets which have 
seized up to break into the vicious circle of poverty – even if the pent-up 
demand for it is considerable, it would not appear to automatically increase 
trust and investment rates, particularly among the poor. And secondly, the 
effectiveness of this lubricant is apparently diminished and not increased by 
high levels of social capital – which, in a way, can be seen as a substitute for 
formal insurance.  
Figure 2: mean values of insurance-induced trust by number of 
associational memberships 
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Figure 3: mean values of insurance-induced trust by income category 
 
Respon-
dent 235 
 
The effectiveness of insurance, measured as extra trust induced by modifying 
the trust game – or the effective demand for insurance, is also responsive in 
Table 9 to female (but not male) education, microfinance membership and 
(without statistical significance) to extension contact. The apparent lesson 
from this is once again that complementarities matter in determining the 
effectiveness of assets within the anti-risk portfolio, and specifically in 
enabling insurance to create trust. 
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Table 9 Policy determinants of experimental effectiveness of insurance 
 
 
 
 
Regression 
coefficients on 
independent 
variables: 
Dependent variable: ‘insurance effectiveness’ (player 1 offer under 
insurance, less mean of player 1 offers under no insurance). OLS 
analysis; Student’s t-statistics in brackets. * denotes significance at 5% 
level. Number of observations = 34 (i.e. those taking out insurance within 
insurance game) 
Constant -174.6 
(0.87) 
-116.7 
(0.53) 
187.5 
(0.91) 
Monthly 
household 
income per 
equivalent adult 
  0.001* 
(2.02) 
Risk efficacy 
measure 
(composite 
asset index) 
127.8* 
(2.20) 
151.9 
(1.33) 
 
Composite 
social capital 
(associational 
membership) 
index 
 -88.1* 
(1.95) 
-75.9 
(1.47) 
Microfinance 
membership 
248.4** 
(2.86) 
  
Extension 
access 
895.4 
(1.52) 
  
Male education -364 
(1.28) 
  
Female 
education 
571.5** 
(2.78) 
  
R2 0.282 0.126 0.141 
Number of 
observations 
34 34 34 
Source: ‘insurance games’ 27/8/03 and 28/8/03 (for rubric see Appendix), in association with the 
Uganda database (Horrell et al. 2003). 
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               Thus, trust cannot be bought, but it can be created by factors other 
than ‘social history’, under certain circumstances. Firstly, it appears, in some 
experiments and very unrobustly, to respond to increased well-being (as well 
as the other way about). But secondly, the trust which people place in others 
ought in principle to be increased by reducing the costs which result if that 
trust is abused or exploited – which insurance does, if properly implemented. 
Using experimental methods we find that the offer of insurance may indeed 
have this effect, but it is not certain to. It will only elicit higher trust, it seems, if 
certain complementary factors are present – the most important of which 
appear to be education and membership of microfinance groups; what makes 
insurance work is not only how it is designed but whether it is ‘joined up’ with 
other characteristics. These are mere statistical correlations: additional 
research is needed particularly to assess what the chemistry is which causes 
trust to be built on when these catalysts are present. 
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Appendix. Instructions for the ‘insurance game’ 
(NB: to visualise the original ‘trust game’, simply omit the portions in bold. The rubric for the 
original trust game is deliberately as close as possible to that used by Abigail Barr and 
Michael Shambare in Zimbabwe (see Barr 2003), and we are grateful to Dr Barr for the use of 
her field notes.) 
 
Note to researchers – Players 1 and 2 once selected should be separated in 
two rooms/locations before you begin this game. The risk of collusion is 
greater due to the tripling effect which makes this worth while. First instruct 
the player 1’s in a group, then take all of their offers. Ask them to wait while 
you play with the Player 2’s and then call back the Player 1’s to pay them off.  
 
 
General instructions 
 
Thank you all for taking the time to come today. This game may take up to an 
hour, so if you think you will not be able to stay that long without leaving 
please let us know now. Before we begin I want to make some general 
comments about what we are doing here today and explain some rules that 
we need to follow. We will be playing a game for real money that you will take 
home. You should understand that this is not our own money. It is money 
given to me by my university/ the University of Sheffield in England to do a 
research study. This is research – which will eventually be part of a book; it is 
not part of a development project of any sort. Before we proceed any further, 
let me stress: if at any point you decide you do not wish to participate in the 
game for any reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started 
the game or not.  
 
If you have heard about a game that has been played here in the past you 
should try to forget everything that you have been told. This is a completely 
different game. We are about to begin. Please listen as carefully as possible, 
because only people who understand the game will actually be able to play it. 
I will run through some examples here while we are all together. You cannot 
ask questions of one another or talk about the game while we are here 
together. This is very important and please make sure that you obey this rule, 
because it is possible for one person to spoil the game for everyone, in which 
case we would not be able to play the game today. So do not worry if you do 
not completely understand the game as we go through the examples here in 
the group. Each of you will have a chance to ask questions in private with 
(me/Paul) to be sure that you understand how to play. 
 
Insurance game instructions 
 
The game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 
and a Player 2. Each of you will play this game with someone from your own 
village. However, none of you will know exactly with whom you are playing. 
 30
Only (Sarah)13 knows who is to play with whom and she will never tell anyone 
else. 
 
Sarah will give Sh 4000 to each Player 1 and another Sh4000 to each Player 
2. They could give Sh 4000, or 3000, or 2000, or 1000, or nothing. Whatever 
amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 2 will be tripled by Sarah before it is 
passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any portion of 
this tripled amount to Player 1. To protect her/himself against the 
possibility that the money will not come back, Player 1’s are allowed to 
pay an insurance premium of Sh1000 to us if they decide to make a 
payment to Player 2,and if that payment does not come back, we will 
refund that payment, net of the premium. Then the game is over. 
 
 
Player 1 goes home with whatever he or she kept from their original Sh4000, 
plus anything returned to them by Player 2, plus any payouts from the 
insurance fund, less any insurance premium paid. Player 2 goes home 
with their original Sh4000, plus whatever was given to them by Player 1 and 
then tripled by Sarah, minus whatever they returned to Player 1. 
 
Here are some examples (you should work through these examples by having 
all the possibilities laid out in front of people, with Player 1’s options from 
Sh4000  to 0  and a second column showing the effects of the tripling. As you 
go through each example demonstrate visually what happens to the final 
outcomes for each player. Be careful to remind people that Player 2 always 
also has the original Sh4000): 
 
1. Imagine that Player 1 gives his entire Sh4000 to Player 2. He does not 
take out insurance (he cannot – he has given everything to Player 
2). Sarah triples this amount, so Player 2 gets Sh12000 (3 times 
Sh4000) over and above their initial Sh 4000. At this point Player 1 has 
nothing and Player 2 has Sh16000. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh 3000 to Player 1. At the 
end of the game Player 1 will go home with Sh3000 and Player 2 will 
go home with Sh13000. 
2. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh3000 to 
Player 2. He also pays an insurance premium of Sh1000. Sarah 
triples the Sh3000 which is handed over, so  Player 2 gets Sh9000 (3 
times Sh3000 equals Sh9000) over and above their original Sh4000. At 
this point, Player 1 has nothing and Player 2 has Sh13000. Then 
                                                 
13 Sarah Khanakwa, the excellent survey coordinator. 
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Player 2 has to decide whether they wish to give anything back to 
Player 1, and if so how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return 
nothing to Player 1. Player 1 claims on his insurance policy, getting 
back the Sh3000 he paid over. At the end of the game Player 1 will 
go home with Sh3000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh13000. 
(Note: Player 1’s gain from being insured is Sh2000, compare the 
corresponding example from the trust game) 
3. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh2000 to 
Player 2. He pays an insurance premium of Sh1000. Sarah triples 
this amount, So Player 2 gets Sh 6000 (3 times 2000 equals 6000) 
over and above their original Sh 4000. At this point, Player 1 has 
Sh1000 and Player 2 has Sh 10000. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh3000 to Player 1. This is 
more than the amount paid over to player 2, so the insurance 
company does not pay up.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go 
home with Sh4000 and player 2 will go home with Sh7000. 
(Loss from being insured (gain to insurance company)- Sh 1000) 
4. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh 1000 to 
player 2. He does not take out insurance. Sarah triples this amount, 
so Player 2 gets Sh3000 (3 times Sh1000 equals Sh3000) over and 
above their initial Sh4000. At this point, Player 1 has Sh3000 and 
Player 2 has Sh7000. Then player 2 has to decide whether they wish to 
give anything back to Player 1,and if so, how much. Suppose Player 2 
decides to return Sh2000 to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 1 
will go home with Sh 5000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh5000.  
5. How let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives nothing to 
Player 2. There is nothing for Sarah to triple. Player 2 has nothing to 
give back and the game ends there. Player 1 goes home with Sh4000 
and Player 2 goes home with Sh4000. 
 
Note that the larger the amount that Player 1 gives to Player 2, the greater the 
amount that can be taken away by the two players together. However, it is 
entirely up to Player 2 to decide what he should give back to Player 1. The 
first player could end up with more than Sh4000 or less than Sh4000 as a 
result. In this version of the game, s/he can protect herself against 
‘exploitation’ by taking out an insurance policy. But there are limits to 
what an insurance policy will protect – if the second player returns 
nothing, the first player’s maximum take-home pay is only Sh3000, 
against the Sh4000 with which s/he started.  
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We will go through more examples with each of you individually when you 
come to play the game. In the meantime, do not talk to anyone about the 
game. Even if you are not sure that you understand the game, do not talk to 
anyone about it. This is important. If you talk to anyone about the game while 
you are waiting to play, we must disqualify you from playing. 
 
 
[Bring in each Player 1 one by one. Use as many of the examples below as 
necessary.] 
 
6. Imagine that Player 1 gives his entire Sh4000 to Player 2. Sarah triples 
this amount, so Player 2 gets Sh12000 (3 times Sh4000) over and 
above their initial Sh 4000. At this point Player 1 has nothing and 
Player 2 has Sh16000. Then Player 2 has to decide whether they wish 
to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how much. Suppose Player 
2 decides to return Sh 6000 to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 
1 will go home with Sh6000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh10000. 
7. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh3000 to 
Player 2. He pays Sh 1000 as an insurance premium. Sarah triples 
this amount, so  Player 2 gets Sh9000 (3 times Sh3000 equals 
Sh9000) over and above their original Sh4000. At this point, Player 1 
has nothing and Player 2 has Sh13000. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh1000 to Player 1. This is 
less than the Sh3000 he handed over, so the ‘insurance policy’ 
pays out the shortfall of  Sh2000.  At the end of the game, 
therefore, Player 1 will go home with Sh3000 and Player 2 will go 
home with Sh12000. 
Gain from insurance - 1000 
8. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh2000 to 
Player 2, and pays Sh 1000 as an insurance premium. Sarah triples 
the Sh 2000 paid over, So Player 2 gets Sh 6000 (3 times 2000 equals 
6000) over and above their original Sh 4000. At this point, Player 1 has 
Sh1000 and Player 2 has Sh 10000. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return nothing to Player 1. Player 
1 claims Sh2000 on his insurance policy. At the end of the game 
Player 1 will go home with Sh3000 and player 2 will go home with 
Sh10000. 
Gain from insurance - 1000 
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9. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh 1000 to 
player 2. He pays Sh 1000 as an insurance premium. Sarah triples 
the Sh 1000 handed over, so Player 2 gets Sh3000 (3 times Sh1000 
equals Sh3000) over and above their initial Sh4000. At this point, 
Player 1 has Sh2000 and Player 2 has Sh7000. Then player 2 has to 
decide whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1,and if so, 
how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh2000 to Player 1. 
This is more than the amount handed over, so the insurance 
policy does not pay out. At the end of the game Player 1 will go 
home with Sh 4000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh5000. 
Loss from insurance(gain to insurance company) - 1000 
10. How let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives nothing to 
Player 2. There is nothing for Sarah to triple. Player 2 has nothing to 
give back and the game ends there. Player 2 goes home with Sh4000 
and Player 2 goes home with Sh4000. 
 
Now can you work through these examples for me: 
 
11. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh3000 to Player 2. So, Player 2 gets Sh 
9000 (3 times Sh3000 equals Sh9000) over and above their initial 
Sh4000.  Player 1 also takes out an insurance policy, costing him 
Sh1000. At this point, Player 1, therefore has nothing and Player 2 has 
Sh13000. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh5000 to Player 1. At 
the end of the game Player 1 will have how much? [the initial Sh4000 
,less Sh3000(given to Player 2)=Sh 1000 plus return from player 2 of 
Sh5000, less Sh 1000 insurance policy=Sh5000. If they are finding it 
difficult, talk through the maths with them, demonstrating with the 
actual money]. And Player 2 will have how much? [Their original Sh 
4000 plus Sh 9000 after the tripling less Sh5000 which they return to 
Player 1= Sh8000.] And how much does the insurance policy pay 
out? – [nothing, because player 1 gets back more than the amount 
he paid in.] 
 
12. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh3000 to 
Player 2. He pays Sh 1000 as an insurance premium. Sarah triples 
this amount, so  Player 2 gets Sh9000 (3 times Sh3000 equals 
Sh9000) over and above their original Sh4000. At this point, what do 
the two players have? ([Player 1 has nothing, because the Sh1000 
which remains to him has to be paid out as an insurance 
premium,  and Player 2 has Sh13000]. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return nothing to Player 1. What 
will the insurance policy pay out? [It will pay out the original stake 
 34
of Sh3000].  At the end of the game, therefore, Player 1 will go home 
with Sh3000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh13000. 
 
 
Gain from insurance – Sh2000 
 
After this ‘training’ play the game with the first player as follows: 
You are Player 1. Here is your $4. [At this point Sh 4000 is placed on the table 
in front of the player.] While I am turned away, you must hand [the Professor] 
the amount of money you want to be tripled and passed on to Player 2. You 
can give Player 2 nothing, Sh1000, Sh2000, Sh3000 or Sh4000. You can 
also decide, if you wish, to take out an insurance policy. If you decide to 
do this, you pay a premium of Sh 1000 and you get back any money 
which you hand over and do not receive in return – less the premium.  
Player 2 will receive the amount which you hand over tripled by me plus their 
own initial Sh4000. Remember that the more you give to Player 2 the greater 
the amount of money at his or her disposal. While Player 2 is under no 
obligation to give anything back, we will pass on to you whatever he or she 
decides to return.[Now the player hands over whatever he or she wants to 
have tripled, and his insurance premium if he decides to take one out, 
and the tripled amount is passed to player 2] 
 
[Note to researcher: Finish off all Player 1’s and send them to a third holding 
location – they must not return to the group of Player 1’s who have not played 
and they must not join the Player 2’s.Once all Player 1’s have played you can 
begin to call Player 2’s. Player 2’s can be paid off immediately after they play 
and sent home.] 
 
 
After dealing with ALL the first players, deal with the second players as 
follows: 
 
You are Player 2. First, here is your Sh4000. [Put the Sh4000 in front of 
Player 2.] Let’s put that to one side.[Move the Sh4000 to one side but leave it 
on the table.] This pile represents Player 1’s initial Sh 4000.[Put this Sh 4000 
in front of the researcher.] Now I will show you how much Player 1 decided to 
give to you. Then I will triple it. Then you must hand back the amount that you 
want returned to Player 1. [Take Player 1’s offer out of the pile representing 
Player 1’s stake and put it down in front of Player 2, near but not on top of 
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Player 2’s Sh4000. Then add to Player 1’s offer to get the tripled amount. 
Receive back Player 2’s response.] Remember, you can choose to give 
something back or not. Do what you wish. While I am turned away, you must 
hand [the professor] the amount of money you want to send back to Player 1. 
[Now the player hands back his return for Player 1]. You are now free to go 
home, but do not visit with any of the waiting players. 
 36
